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LIBERTY FROM OFFICIALS BY GRACE: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENTS APPLICATION TO AUTOMOBILE
PASSENGERS IN MARYLAND V. WILSON
Get your motor running,
head out on the highway,
Looking for adventure
and whatever comes our way.1
On February 19, 1997, the United States Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Maryland v. Wilson,2 and put an
end to twenty years of speculation regarding a police officer's
authority to order a passenger out of a lawfully stopped auto-
mobile. In finding that such an order does not violate a
passenger's Fourth Amendment privacy interests, the Supreme
Court reversed Maryland's Court of Special Appeals and sided
with the majority of states that have considered this narrow is-
sue.3 The Court's decision provides important insight into the
current state of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the Su-
preme Court's increasing willingness to sacrifice individual
liberties, particularly in the automobile context, to further law
enforcement objectives.
The Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Pennsylvania v.
Mimms,4 provided the touchstone for the Court's analysis in
Wilson. In Mimms, after balancing societal interests against the
privacy interests of a driver, the Court held that an officer may
1. STEPPENWOLF, Born to Be Wild, on BORN TO BE WILD RETROSPECTIVE 1966-
1990 (MCA Records 1991).
2. 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
3. See Doctor v. State, 573 So. 2d 157 (Fla. App. 1991); People v. Salvator, 602
N.E.2d 953 (Dl. App. Ct. 1992); Warr v. State, 580 N.E.2d 265 (Ind. App. 1991);
State v. Landry, 588 So. 2d 345 (La. 1991); People v. Martinez, 483 N.W.2d 868
(Mich. 1992); State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978); State v. Reynolds, 753
S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Robinson, 543 N.E.2d 733 (N.Y. 1989); State
v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1993).
4. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
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order a driver out of a lawfully stopped vehicle.5 In extending
Mimms to passengers, the Court employed the same balancing
test to examine the reasonableness of the government's ac-
tions.6 Balancing police officer safety against the privacy inter-
ests of automobile passengers, the Court in Wilson recognized
that the balance of interests for passengers differs only slightly
from that of drivers.7 However, the Court ultimately found that
because the presence of passengers is likely to increase the risk
to officers, and the additional intrusion on the passenger is
minimal, an automatic police prerogative to order a passenger
out of a vehicle is reasonable.'
While the result in Wilson is not surprising, the decision is
important in three respects. First, Wilson demonstrates the
Court's willingness to withdraw Fourth Amendment protections
where many would argue an individual has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. Second, Wilson illustrates that the automobile
has acquired a distinct "taint" for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, separate from its historical justifications.9 Because
of this taint, the Court is less willing to extend Fourth Amend-
ment protections to individuals or property in an automobile.
While the Court in Wilson did not expressly address the role
this automotive taint played in its holding, a review of the
Court's analysis strongly suggests that the automobile taint lies
at the root of its decision. Third, the Court in Wilson expressly
reserved the question of whether a passenger, once ordered out
5. See id. at 109-12.
6. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885-86. While the Court stated that it was balanc-
ing society's interest in police officer safety against a passenger's privacy interests, a
cursory review of the analysis illustrates that the Court's "balancing" was at best
token. See infra notes 89-125 and accompanying text.
7. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
8. See id The Court used a single study detailing police officer assaults and
deaths during traffic stops to suggest that an order to passengers to alight from a
car will increase police officer safety. The lack of empirical data to support such a
proposition suggests that other factors controlled the Court's decision.
9. "Taint" is not used as a term of art in this context and does not implicate
broader Fourth Amendment issues. For purposes of this case note, "taint" is analo-
gous to contaminated, infected, or suspect.
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of a car, may be detained. ° To the chagrin of those concerned
with the diminishing protections of personal liberty, the deci-
sion in Wilson strongly suggests that when the Supreme Court
is eventually presented with the issue, it will find that a pas-
senger can be detained for the duration of the stop.
Part I of this case note discusses the historical context in
which Wilson was decided, and explores how lower courts ruled
on the issue. Part II reviews the facts in Wilson and addresses
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals' reliance on Mimms'
Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. Part HI discusses
the Supreme Court's decision. Part IV discusses how, after
Wilson, the Supreme Court will likely resolve other Fourth
Amendment issues raised in the automobile context. Part V
concludes by briefly discussing the full implications of Wilson.
I. PENNSYLVANIA V. MIMMs AND ITS APPLICABILITY
TO PASSENGERS
A. Pennsylvania v. Mimms
Pennsylvania v. Mimms," is the landmark case under which
Wilson was decided. The Supreme Court in Mimms considered
whether a police officer, after having lawfully detained a motor
vehicle for a traffic violation, may order the driver to alight
from the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment pro-
scription of unreasonable searches and seizures.' In Mimms, a
vehicle was stopped for an expired license tag.1" Although the
10. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
Maryland urges us to go further and hold that an officer may forcibly
detain a passenger for the entire duration of the stop. But respondent
was subjected to no detention based on the stopping of the car once he
had left it; his arrest was based on probable case to believe that he was
guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The question
which Maryland wishes answered, therefore, is not presented by this
case, and we express no opinion upon it.
Id at 886 n.3.
11. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
12. See id. at 108-12.
13. See id. at 107.
'1997]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:549
officer did not suspect any specific criminal activity, he ordered
the driver to step out of the vehicle and produce identifica-
tion.'4 The officer did so in accordance with a departmental
policy which had been adopted as a precautionary measure. 5
However, once the driver was outside the vehicle, the officer
noticed a large bulge in his jacket, frisked him, and found a
loaded revolver.'6 The driver was ultimately convicted for car-
rying a concealed weapon and argued on appeal that the officer
had no authority to order him from the vehicle based merely on
the underlying traffic offense.'
The touchstone of the Court's analysis under the Fourth
Amendment was "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of
the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal
security."" The Court in Mimms recognized that
"[r]easonableness, of course, depends 'on a balance between the
public interest and the individual's right to personal security
free from arbitrary interference by law officers.'"' 9 Thus, the
Court reviewed the reasonableness of the officer's order by
balancing the increased safety of the officer against the "intru-
sion into the driver's personal liberty."" Ultimately, the Court
found that the officer's order was reasonable and did not violate
the driver's Fourth Amendment protections. "What is at most a
mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legiti-
mate concerns for the officer's safety."
2
'
While the Court considered several factors in determining the
reasonableness of the order, officer safety was likely paramount.
The Court explained: "We think it too plain for argument that
the State's proffered justification-the safety of the officer-is
14. See id.
15. See id. at 109-10.
16. See id. at 107.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 108-09 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
19. Id. at 109 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
20. Id. at 111. It is important to note that in Mimms the Court recognized that
"there is no question about the propriety of the initial restrictions on respondents
freedom of movement." Id. at 109. The narrow question before the Court was the rea-
sonableness of "the incremental intrusion resulting from the request to get out of the
car once the vehicle was lawfully stopped." Id.
21. Id. at 111.
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both legitimate and weighty.' While the Court recognized
that "the officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the
particular driver at the time of the stop,"'m it buttressed the
safety argument by pointing to the "inordinate risk confronting
an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automo-
bile." The Court was persuaded by a single study which de-
tailed the high number of shootings that occur when police
officers approach suspects seated in automobiles.25 Additional-
ly, the Court found that in United States v. Robinson,26 it had
previously "expressly declined to accept the argument that traf-
fic violations necessarily involve less danger to officers than
other types of confrontations."2"
Another important factor considered by the Court in Mimms
was the incremental nature of the intrusion into the driver's
personal liberty." For the Court, recognizing that the driver
had already been stopped by the police, the only question was
whether or not "he shall spend that period sitting in the
driver's seat of his car or standing along side it."' The Court
explained that "[t]he driver is being asked to expose to view
very little more of his person than is already exposed.""0
In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's use of
the Bristow study to support its contention that a police officer
can protect himself by ordering a driver out of a vehicle.3 ' Jus-
tice Stevens pointed out that the author of the study made no
attempt to obtain a random selection of cases involving automo-
22. Id at 110.
23. Id at 109.
24. Id. at 110.
25. See id. (referring to Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evolution, 54
J. CPMI. L.C. & P.S. 93 (1963)). While the majority could have undoubtedly offered
more compelling statistics to bolster their claim that traffic stops are dangerous en-
counters, the fact they did not again suggests that other factors guided the Coures
decision.
26. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
27. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234).
28. See id. at 111.
29. Id
30. Id
31. See id. at 118 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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biles.32 In fact, many of the cases in the study involved shoot-
ings in which the police officer was in his police car, dismount-
ing from his vehicle, or shot by a passenger in the vehicle.'
Most importantly, Justice Stevens argued that the study lended
no support for the Court's "assumption" that ordering a driver
out of his car in any way enhances the officer's safety." Jus-
tice Stevens cited several experts who recommended that police
officers can best protect themselves by ordering the driver to
remain in the car."5
Mimms provided an easy-to-understand, bright-line standard
for police officers dealing with the driver of a lawfully stopped
vehicle. In spite of the fact that the Court made a passing
reference to a passenger in Minm's car, the Court limited its
holding to drivers."M While Justice Stevens argued that Mimms
must apply to passengers as well as drivers,37 the past nine-
32. See id. at 118 n-7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. See id. at 118 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 119 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Never allow the violator to get out of the
car and stand to its left. If he does get out, which should be avoided, walk him to
the rear and right side of the car. Quite obviously this is a much safer area to con-
duct a conversation."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing V. FOLLEY, POLICE PATROL TECHNIQUES AND TAC-
TICS 95 (1973)).
The officer should stand slightly to the rear of the front door and door-
post. This will prevent the violator from suddenly opening the door and
striking the officer. In order to thoroughly protect himself as much as
possible, the officer should reach with his weak hand and push the lock
button down if the window is open. This will give an indication to the
driver that he is to remain inside the vehicle. It will also force the driv-
er to turn his head to talk with the officer. The officer should advise the
violator why he was stopped and then explain what action the officer in-
tends to take, whether it is a verbal or written warning, or a written
citation. If the suspect attempts to exit his vehicle, the officer should
push the door closed, lock it, if possible, and tell the driver to 'please
stay in the carl' Then he should request [the] identification he desires
and request the violator to hand the material out of the window away
from the vehicle. The officer should not stare at the identification but
[should) return to his vehicle by backing away from the suspect car. As
the patrolman backs away, he should keep his eyes on the occupant(s).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing A. YOUNT, VEHICLE STOPS MANUAL, MISDEMEANOR
AND FELONY 2-3 (1976)).
36. See id at 107, 111-12. It is interesting to note that the passenger in Mimms'
automobile was also carrying a revolver. However, other than this passing reference,
there is no discussion of passengers or passenger privacy interests.
37. See id. at 122-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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teen years have demonstrated that at least some courts dis-
agree.
B. The Applicability of Mimms to Passengers-Divided Lower
Courts
While resolving the constitutional ramifications of ordering a
driver from a car, Mimms left the lower courts divided as to its
applicability to passengers.' The majority of courts relied on
the Mimms' analysis to find that an officer's order to a passen-
ger to alight from a lawfully stopped vehicle is reasonable un-
der the Fourth Amendment. 9 These courts found that the rea-
soning underlying Mimms "recognizes that when an officer
detains a vehicle for violation of a traffic law, it is inherently
reasonable that he or she be concerned with safety and, as a
result, may order the occupants of the vehicle to alight from the
car."
4°
Because the balance of convenience and danger is no different for passen-
gers in stopped cars, the Court's logic necessarily encompasses the pas-
senger. This is true even though the passenger has committed no traffic
offense. If the rule were limited to situations in which individualized
inquiry identified a basis for concern in particular cases, then the charac-
ter of the violation might justify different treatment of the driver and the
passenger. But when the justification rests on nothing more than an
assumption about the danger associated with every stop-no matter how
trivial the offense-the new rule must apply to the passenger as well as
to the driver.
Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. See Doctor v. State, 573 So. 2d 157 (Fla. App. 1991); People v. Salvator, 602
N.E.2d 953 (ill. App. Ct. 1992); Warr v. State, 580 N.E.2d 265 (Ind. App. 1991);
State v. Landry, 588 So. 2d 345 (La. 1991); People v. Martinez,, 483 N.W.2d 868
(Mich. 1992); State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978); People v. Robinson, 543
N.E.2d 733 (N.Y. 1989); State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1993). But see State
v. Becker, 458 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa 1990); State v. Smith, 637 A.2d 158 (N.J. 1994);
State v. Johnson, 601 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
39. See Doctor v. State, 573 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. App. 1991); People v. Salvator,
602 N.E.2d 953, 962-63 (11. App. Ct. 1992); Warr v. State, 580 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind.
App. 1991); State v. Landry, 588 So. 2d 345, 347 (La. 1991); People v. Martinez, 483
N.W.2d 868 (Mich. 1992); State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. 1978); People
v. Robinson, 543 N.E.2d 733, 734 (N.Y. 1989); State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 95-96
(N.D. 1993).
40. Commonwealth v. Brown, 654 A.2d 1096, 1102 (Pa. 1995) (emphasis added).
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Two subsequent Supreme Court decisions seemed to reaffirm
the contention that Mimms was not to be limited to drivers.
One year after the Court announced its decision in Mimms, it
handed down its opinion in Rakas v. Illinois.4 In his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Powell described the Court's holding in
Mimms writing that "[1]ast Term, this Court determined that
passengers in automobiles have no Fourth Amendment right not
to be ordered from their vehicle, once a proper stop is made."42
Additionally, in the landmark case of Michigan v. Long,4 the
Court described Mimms as holding that "police may order per-
sons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic viola-
tion. " "H While some courts relied solely on Rakas and Long to
extend Mimms' automatic police prerogative to passengers,'4
the majority of courts took note of the Supreme Court's subse-
quent discussion of Mimms and independently balanced societal
interests against the privacy interest of the passenger.
State v. Landry," is representative of state court cases
which have found that an automatic police prerogative to order
passengers out of a stopped vehicle does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Indicative of those courts which have extended
Mimms to passengers, Landry discussed at length the danger-
ous and confrontational nature of traffic stops in regard to
society's interest in protecting police officers.47 However, in
completing the balancing analysis the court considered the costs
41. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
42. Id at 155 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
43. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
44. Id at 1047-48 (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., State v. McCoy, 824 F. Supp. 467 (D. Del. 1993); State v. Soares,
648 A.2d 804 (R.I. 1994).
46. 588 So. 2d 345 (La. 1991).
47. See id. at 347. The court echoed the finding in Mimms that "[a] police officer
who stops a vehicle for a routine traffic offense may be exposed, according to the
circumstances, to a significant risk of attack .... ." Id- This finding runs directly
contrary to the courts earlier evaluation of traffic stops in State v. Williams, 366 So.
2d 1369 (La. 1978). There, the court questioned both the seriousness of the danger
faced by officers in such circumstances and whether ordering the driver out of the
vehicle actually increased the officer's safety. See Williams, 366 So. 2d at 1373-74.
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of such an order to passengers de minimis." The court conclud-
ed that the officer had a right to order the defendant out of the
vehicle "in order to ensure the officer's safety."49
Commonwealth v. Brown"0 is another example where a lower
court found that a police officer "may request both drivers and
their passengers to alight from a lawfully stopped car without
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot."5' In apply-
ing the Mimms balancing analysis, the court in Brown detailed
the safety risk to police officers but made no inquiry into the
distinct privacy interests of passengers.52 In fact, the extent of
the court's discussion of the personal liberty analysis was a
passing reference to the de minimis nature of the intrusion for
the "occupants" of a stopped car.5" The court not only adopted
the finding of Mimms, that traffic stops pose a significant safe-
ty threat to police officers, but also went on to assert that "the
potential danger to police increases, rather than diminishes,
when passengers are present in a car."'
Both Landry and Brown upheld an automatic prerogative to
order passengers out of a car by focusing almost exclusively on
the safety concerns of police officers. The result of these deci-
sions is that a police officer need not assess the circumstances
of each traffic stop, but may, as a right, order all of the passen-
48. See Landry, 588 So. 2d at 347.
Although the passenger was not detained because of a traffic violation,
he was stopped as a matter of necessity when the vehicle was stopped
for the violation. If the passenger desired to remain with the car during
the time necessary for the officer to issue a ticket to the driver, the
officer's merely removing the passenger from the vehicle during the brief
period of detention of the driver constituted more of a slight inconve-
nience to the passenger than a serious intrusion upon his privacy inter-
ests.
Id.
49. Id.
50. 654 A.2d 1096 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
51. Id. at 1102.
52. See id.
53. See id. The cursory treatment of a passenger's privacy interests in Brown is
particularly telling when contrasted with other courts' treatment of the same issues.
See State v. Smith, 637 A.2d 158 (N.J. 1994) (discussed infra notes 55-57 and accom-
panying text).
54. Brown, 654 A2d at 1102.
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gers out of a legally stopped vehicle. However, not all lower
courts found that the Mimms' balancing of interests necessarily
required this result.
In State v. Smith,55 the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that an automatic police prerogative to order passengers out of
a stopped vehicle is unreasonable for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses. Applying the Mimms balancing test, the court found that
"[t]he safety concerns of a police officer unquestionably merit
grave consideration."" However, in weighing the intrusion into
the passenger's liberty, the court found that "[blecause the
passenger has not engaged in culpable conduct, the passenger
has a legitimate expectation that no further inconvenience will
be occasioned by any intrusions beyond the delay caused by the
lawful stop."57 The court found that this distinction between a
passenger's and driver's expectation of privacy after the vehicle
is stopped is critical for Fourth Amendment purposes, and de-
mands a result different from that reached in Mimms.
Professor Wayne LaFave, in his treatise on Fourth Amend-
ment issues, agreed with the New Jersey Supreme Court's
balancing of interests." In his treatise, LaFave used State v.
Williams59 to illustrate what he believed to be the appropriate
balancing of interests. LaFave suggested that police officers
could adequately protect themselves during automobile stops by
"allow[ing] passengers to remain in the stopped vehicle and
instead [have] the driver accompany them to the police vehicle
while the citation is prepared."" Whether LaFave's recommen-
dation would adequately address police officer concerns is un-
certain. However, it is interesting to note that Williams, relied
upon by LaFave, was subsequently overruled by Landry in
1991.61 Louisiana now recognizes that an automatic preroga-
tive allowing police to order passengers from a car is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
55. 637 A.2d 158 (N.J. 1994).
56. Id. at 165.
57. Id at 166;
58. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 9.4(a), at 514-15 (2d ed. 1987).
59. 366 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1978).
60. LAFAVE, supra note 58, at 515.
61. See State v. Landry, 588 So. 2d 345 (La. 1991).
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II. MARYLAND V. WILSON
In deciding Maryland v. Wilson,62 the Supreme Court put an
end to the uncertainty regarding the scope of Mimms and un-
equivocally found that the Mimms analysis applies equally to
passengers." While the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
joined the minority of states declining to extend the Mimms
analysis to passengers," the Supreme Court adopted the ratio-
nale employed in Landry and Brown. In overturning the Mary-
land decision, the Court expounded on the dangers police of-
ficers face in traffic stops and only briefly mentioned the priva-
cy interests of passengers.
A. Facts of the Case
In Wilson, Maryland State Trooper David Hughes observed a
white 1994 Nissan Maxima driving at what appeared to be a
high rate of speed.' Trooper Hughes paced the car for approx-
imately a mile and determined it was traveling at sixty-four
miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone.66 Trooper
Hughes also observed that the car lacked proper license
plates."7 At this point, he stopped the automobile.
As Trooper Hughes approached the vehicle, the driver spon-
taneously exited. Trooper Hughes informed the driver why he
had been stopped and asked for his license and registration.
The driver indicated that the registration papers were in the
glove compartment and got back into the car. Trooper Hughes
then ordered Wilson, the front seat passenger, out of the vehi-
cle. When Wilson complied with the Trooper's directions to walk
back towards the police vehicle, crack cocaine fell on the
ground. Wilson was arrested.68
62. 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
63. See id. at 886.
64. See State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 2 (Md. 1995), rev'd 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
65. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
66. See id
67. See id.
68. See id.
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The trial court's findings rendered other facts moot, including
Trooper Hughes' observation that the driver and Wilson ap-
peared nervous. Judge Bollinger found that Trooper Hughes
had no suspicion and possessed no fear that Wilson was armed
and dangerous at the time he was ordered from the car.69
Judge Bollinger's conclusion "was not that there was no basis
for a reasonable suspicion that Wilson was armed and danger-
ous, but rather that Trooper Hughes entertained no such suspi-
cion, reasonable or unreasonable."0 This finding put squarely
before the Court the narrow issue of whether a police officer
may, without any level of suspicion, order a passenger out of a
lawfully stopped car.
In granting Wilson's motion to suppress, Judge Bollinger
found that the order violated Wilson's Fourth Amendment right
against having his person unreasonably seized." The Court of
Special Appeals found specifically that a police officer's auto-
matic right to order a driver to exit a vehicle during a routine
traffic stop does not extend to passengers in the stopped vehicle
and upheld the circuit court's determination. The Maryland
Court of Appeals denied certiorari.
B. Maryland's Court of Special Appeals' Decision
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals joined the minority of states which recognized
that balancing societal and passenger interests required a re-
sult contrary to Mimms. The Maryland court began its argu-
ment by attacking the precedential weight of subsequent refer-
ences to Mimms, which stated that the holding applied to pas-
69. See State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 4 (Md. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
Judge Bollinger's conclusion was not that the external circumstances did
not add up to articulable suspicion. That, indeed, would have been a
finding on a mixed question of law and fact and would be subject to de
novo review. Judge Bollinger's finding, by way of contrast, was that
Trooper Hughes did not even possess such a suspicion. That is a finding
of pure fact that can be overturned only if clearly erroneous.
Id.
70. Id.
71. See id at 3.
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sengers as well as drivers.72 The court dismissed as mere dicta
references in Long and Rakas, in which the Supreme Court
suggested that the Mimms holding applied to passengers."
Moreover, the court insisted that "[t]he Mimms opinion was
completely silent on the police prerogative, if any, vis-&-vis a
passenger."74 However, the court was forced to reconcile its
own holding in Derricott v. State,5 where it stated that
Mimms "established unequivocally that when the police have
legitimately stopped an automobile, for a traffic offense or for
any other reason, they are automatically entitled to order the
driver and/or any of the passengers to alight from the vehi-
cle." 5 To overcome its earlier statements, the court explained
that '[t]he overly broad inclusion of the phrase 'and/or any of
the passengers' [in Derricott] was simply wrong. Pennsylvania v.
Mimms did not stand for so broad a proposition."7' The Mary-
land court suggested that "stare decisis is ill served if readers
hang slavishly on every casual or hurried word as if it had bub-
bled from the earth at Delphi. Obiter dicta, if noticed at all,
should be taken with a large grain of salt."78
In addition to attacking the weight and significance of the
precedent, the Maryland court also reviewed the Supreme
Court's balancing analysis and detailed how that balance shifts
when the privacy interests of a passenger are included.79 The
court concluded that "the societal benefit or societal interest is
just as great when considering protecting an officer from a
passenger as it is when protecting an officer from a driver.""
However, the court recognized that the costs to a passenger are
"significantly heavier" than those to a driver.8 ' The court re-
lied on the Smith analysis:
72. See id. at 3-4.
73. See id. at 6-7.
74. Id, at 5.
75. 578 A.2d 791 (1990).
76. Id. at 793-94.
77. State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 8 (Md. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
78. Id
79. See id at 8-12.
80. Id at 9.
81. Id.
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The passenger has not committed any wrongdoing, even at
the level of a traffic infraction. The passenger may not be
issued a traffic ticket or citation, let alone subjected to
custodial arrest. The passenger is not required to furnish
identification or any other documentation.... The passen-
ger is presumptively free to abandon the driver to the
clutches of the law and to hail a cab.
... To order a passenger to stay in the car or to get
out of the car is the imposition of detention per se, and not
a mere shift of the location of already established deten-
tion. 2
According to the court, this distinct set of circumstances re-
quired a result contrary to Mimms. In explaining its decision,
the court stated, "[w]e are simply holding that the prerogative
is not automatic, but requires, for justification, some individu-
alized or particularized suspicion-just as in the case of a frisk
for weapons. Where officer safety is concerned, the reasonable-
ness threshold is low, but there is a threshold."'
Ill. REALIZING THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF MIMMS, THE
SUPREME COURT DECISION IN WILSON
It was in this context that the Supreme Court considered
Wilson. The majority of courts considering Mimms' applicability
to passengers had adopted the Mimms balancing analysis and
found that for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, ordering a
passenger out of a lawfully stopped car is reasonable. A minori-
ty of courts, including the Maryland Court of Special Appeals,
had reasoned that the costs to a passenger were greater than
those considered by the Supreme Court in Mimms. As a result,
these courts found that Mimms did not extend to passengers.
A. The Majority
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began the
Court's opinion by detailing the similarities between Wilson and
82. Id. at 10.
83. Id. at 12.
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Mimms." Recognizing several factual similarities, the majority
pointed out that both Mimms and Wilson were heard by the
Supreme Court after the respective lower courts had found the
officers' oiders unconstitutional.s The majority then reviewed
the balancing analysis in Mimms citing the often quoted line
that "we [think] it 'too plain for argument' that this justifica-
tion-officer safety-was 'both legitimate and weighty."'8 On
the other side of the balance, the Court noted that in Mimms
because "the driver's car was already validly stopped for a traf-
fic infraction... the additional intrusion of asking him to step
outside his car [was] 'de minimis."'' 7
In determining whether or not Mimms extends to passengers,
the majority purported to undertake an independent balancing
of societal benefits and individual costs." On the societal bene-
fit side, the Court recognized that "the same weighty interest in
officer safety is present regardless of whether the occupant of
the stopped car is a driver or passenger."89 To support the con-
tention that "traffic stops may be dangerous encounters," the
majority cited a Federal Bureau of Investigation crime report
which showed that in 1994 alone, there were 5,762 officer as-
saults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops."
Without providing specific statistics to support its contention,
the majority asserted that the presence of passengers "increases
the possible sources of harm to the officer."9' In response to
Justice Stevens' attacks on the majority's use of these statistics,
the majority conceded that the data did not detail the number
of assaults by passengers and those by drivers.9" The majority
84. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997).
85. See id.
86. Id at 885 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977)).
87. Id. (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111).
88. See id. at 885-86. The Court's purported balancing analysis mirrors that em-
ployed in cases such as Commonwealth v. Brown, 654 A.2d 1096, 1102 (Pa. 1995). Its
brevity, focus on police officer safety, and lack of empirical underpinnings strongly
suggest that other factors directed the Court's decision and that the "balancing analy-
sis," while employed by the Court, was without substance.
89. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885.
90. Id.
91. Id-
92. See id at 885 n.2.
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explained, however, that "we need not ignore the data which do
exist simply because further refinement would be even more
helpful."9 3
On the personal liberty side of the balance of interests, the
majority recognized that, "the case for the passengers is in one
sense stronger than, that for the driver.' While an officer has
probable cause to stop the driver of the car, the officer has no
suspicion regarding the passenger.95 However, the Court found
that "as a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped
by virtue of the stop of the vehicle. The only change in their
circumstances which will result from ordering them out of the
car is that they will be outside of, rather than inside of, the
stopped car." Without further discussion of the costs to pas-
sengers, the Court returned to its emphasis on the safety ad-
vantages to police officers." The Court explained that by or-
dering a passenger out of a car, a police officer can remove a
passenger from access to a possible weapon.9"
Interestingly, the Court stated that its opinion in Michigan v.
Summerss offered guidance by analogy."° In Summers, the
Court upheld the detention of the defendant, without reason-
able suspicion or probable cause, during the execution of a
search warrant at a home. When the police arrived to execute
93. Id
94. Id. at 886.
95. See id
96. Id. (emphasis added). The fact that a passenger is stopped as a practical mat-
ter is distinct from the fact that a driver is stopped based on probable cause. Howev-
er, nowhere does the Court recognize this distinction. By analogizing a passenger's
circumstances to those of a driver, the Court states that in both situations the intru-
sion occasioned by an order to alight is de minimis. Justice Stevens, in his dissent,
suggested that this obscures the real question at issue. See id. at 886 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
97. See id. at 886. After discussing the "personal liberty side of the balance" for
only four lines, Rehnquist reverted to his focus on police officer safety. The fact that
the majority cannot dedicate more than four lines to weighing the costs to passengers
in these traffic stop situations illustrates the significant weight the Court places on
"police officer safety." This focus on police officer safety would be more understand-
able if there were the slightest indication that the Court's holding would have the ef-
fect of eliminating some of the danger associated with traffic stops.
98. See id.
99. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
100. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
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the warrant, they encountered Summers leaving the house. In
upholding the police officers' authority to require Summers to
remain at the house during the search, the Court stated that
"the risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is mini-
mized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command
of the situation."0'
With no explanation of how Summers applied specifically in
the Wilson context, the Court concluded that officers likely face
greater danger from traffic stops where passengers are present
than those in which only a driver is stopped.0 2 The majority
balanced this against what the Court viewed as a minimal
additional intrusion on the passenger, and held that "an officer
making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the
car pending completion of the stop."'03 In a footnote, the Court
explained that Maryland urged the Court to find that "an offi-
cer may forcibly detain a passenger for the entire duration of
the stop."' However, recognizing that the facts of the case
did not include such circumstances, the Court expressed no
opinion on that issue.0 5
B. The Dissent
Justice Stevens began his dissent by explaining that in
Mimms, "the Court answered the 'narrow question' whether an
'incremental intrusion' on the liberty of a person who had been
lawfully seized was reasonable.""° Justice Stevens contrasted
that narrow holding with the "separate and significant ques-
tion" raised in Wilson of whether a State can seize someone
without any level of suspicion whatsoever."°  For Justice
Stevens, these different questions required different results.
101. Id. at 886 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03).
102. See id
103. Id.
104. Id. at 886 n.3.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 109 (1977)).
107. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens conceded that there is a strong public inter-
est in police officer safety.108  However, he attacked the
majority's use of a single study and general statistics regarding
police officer assaults and deaths to support the proposition
that removal of passengers is reasonable."° Justice Stevens
pointed out that the statistics relied upon by the majority did
not distinguish traffic incidents involving passengers from those
in which only a driver was present."' He noted that the sta-
tistics provided no'insight into the number of police assaults or
deaths that are caused by passengers ordered out of the vehicle
as compared to assaults or deaths caused by passengers that
remain inside the vehicle."' Additionally:
There is no indication that the number of assaults was
smaller in jurisdictions where officers may order passengers
to exit the vehicle without any suspicion than in jurisdic-
tions where they were then prohibited from doing so ....
In short, the statistics are as consistent with the hypothesis
that ordering passengers to get out of a vehicle increases
the danger of assault as with the hypothesis that it reduces
that risk."2
While Justice Stevens recognized the need to protect police
officers, he was not persuaded that the majority's ruling would
have that effect.
In addressing the cost side of the balancing of interests, Jus-
tice Stevens pointed out that a tremendous number of traffic
stops are "routine stops" which "involve otherwise law-abiding
citizens who have committed minor traffic offenses."" Justice
Stevens found that "the aggregation of thousands upon thou-
sands of petty indignities has an impact on freedom that [he]
would characterize as substantial, and which in [his] view
clearly outweighs the evanescent safety concerns pressed by the
108. See id. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. See id (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens attacked the majority in
Mimms for the same shortcoming).
110. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. See id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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majority."" 4
In his dissent, Justice Stevens also expanded on the impor-
tant distinction between the Court's decision in Mimms and the
majority's holding in Wilson." In Mimms, the Court justified
the additional intrusion into the driver's privacy interests based
on the fact that the driver was already lawfully seized."
Thus, the additional intrusion of exiting the vehicle for the
duration of the stop was considered de minimis by the
Court." Justice Stevens recognized that when reviewing a
Wilson situation, a different analysis is required. Unlike the
driver in Mimms, the initial intrusion into the passenger's pri-
vacy interests is a "necessary by-product of the lawful detention
of the driver."" A passenger has not been seized for Fourth
Amendment purposes when a car is stopped. As a result, the
officer's subsequent order for the passenger to exit the vehicle
is an initial seizure-one unsupported by any level of suspi-
cion."
Writing a separate dissent, Justice Kennedy discussed the
implications of the Court's decision when coupled with the re-
cent decision in Whren v. United States."° In Whren, the
Court upheld a rule permitting vehicle stops "if there is some
objective indication that a violation has been committed, regard-
less of the officer's real motives."" 1 Justice Kennedy recog-
nized that based upon the two decisions, "tens of millions of
passengers [are] at risk of arbitrary control by the police."'
Concluding, Justice Kennedy suggested that "[1]iberty comes not
from officials by grace but from the Constitution by right."'
114. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. See id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 888-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)).
117. See id at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 889 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
121. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Whren, 116 S. Ct.
1769 (1996)).
122. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 891 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). While Justice Kennedy's statement might
appear intuitive, it runs directly contrary to the majority's apparent belief that police
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C. The Impact of the Automobile Taint in Wilson
While the decision in Wilson is not altogether surprising, the
Court's analysis is particularly interesting.' The majority
purportedly undertook an independent balancing analysis. How-
ever, the Court's token reference to a passenger's privacy inter-
ests and the lack of empirical support for its holding strongly
suggest that the Court was relying on other factors to reach its
decision. One theory which helps explain the Court's treatment
of these issues and its ultimate holding is the "tainted" nature
of the automobile. After years of cases recognizing diminished
Fourth Amendment protections and expectations of privacy for
passengers in automobiles, the automobile has acquired a taint
distinct from specific historical justifications. This taint has
become increasingly significant for the Supreme Court's deter-
mination of Fourth Amendment issues in the automobile con-
text. Now, the sheer fact that an item or an individual is pres-
ent in an automobile has become determinative for the Court.
The proposition that the automobile has become a place near-
ly void of Fourth Amendment protections is strongly supported
by the Supreme Court's historical treatment of the automobile.
Since its ruling in Carroll v. United States,' the Supreme
officer discretion is the balm to alleviate the danger in traffic stop situations.
124. In addition to the Supreme Court's subsequent categorization of Mimms, the
practical implications of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), suggested that the
Supreme Court would overturn Wilson. In Long, the Court recognized the constitu-
tionality of a Terry frisk of an automobile based on reasonable suspicion holding that
the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to
those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if
the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant" the officers in believing that the suspect
is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.
Id at 1049 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
Long recognized the right of police officers to search a car for weapons based
on a reasonable belief that the driver is dangerous. At the same time the Court reit-
erated how hazardous these encounters are for police officers. Id It is untenable that
the Court would have required a police officer in a Long situation to frisk the pas-
senger compartment of a car without first ordering any passengers out of the vehicle.
It is easy to imagine the vulnerability of a police officer searching for weapons
around a passenger seated in a car.
125. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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Court has recognized that the automobile represents a unique
context for Fourth Amendment issues. In Carroll, "the Court
held that automobiles and other conveyances may be searched
without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the
search without a warrant of a house or an office."" The
Court in Carroll went on to state that
the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed,
practically since the beginning of the Government, as recog-
nizing a necessary difference between a search of a store,
dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a
proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a
search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile for con-
traband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a war-
rant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.'
While Carroll focused specifically on mobility in justifying the
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant re-
quirement, later decisions have illustrated that a car's mobility
is not the only basis for the exception.
In California v. Carney,' the Court reviewed recent cases
to find that
[b]esides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant
requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with
respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that
relating to one's home or office.... These reduced expecta-
tions of privacy derive... from the pervasive regulation of
vehicles.... The public is fully aware that it is accorded
less privacy in its automobiles because of this compelling
governmental need for regulation.'
126. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (describing the Court's holding
in Carroll).
127. Id at 48 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).
128. 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
129. Id. at 391-92 (citations omitted).
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The Court has continued to offer other justifications to ex-
plain the reduced level of Fourth Amendment protection in
automobiles. However, these justifications and the Court's
Fourth Amendment analysis are often disjointed. The tainted
nature of the automobile fills the void and is the key to under-
standing the Court's analysis.
In New York v. Belton,3 ° the Supreme Court was willing to
expand the temporal and spatial nexus requirements of the
search incident to arrest doctrine because the events at issue
took place in an automobile. The officer in Belton ordered all of
the occupants out of an automobile after he developed reason-
able suspicion to believe that drugs were present. After he
confirmed his suspicion and arrested the occupants, he returned
to the car and conducted a search incident to the arrest.13 In
upholding the constitutionality of the search, the Court broadly
defined the Chimel standard to allow the full search of the
passenger compartment of an automobile, if the passenger com-
partment was within reach of the arrestee. 2 Mobility, which
historically provided the basis for the unique treatment of auto-
mobiles, provides insufficient justification for a search in the
Belton context. Additional factors-the automobile taint-un-
derlie the Court's decision.
Rakas v. Illinois1" was another case in which the Supreme
Court's determination of Fourth Amendment issues was signifi-
cantly impacted by the tainted nature of the automobile. In
Rakas, as in Belton, the Court was willing to limit Fourth
Amendment protections because the case involved an automo-
bile. Responding to a robbery report, police in Rakas stopped a
vehicle they believed to be the getaway car.' After ordering
all of the occupants out of the car, the police searched it and
discovered a box of rifle shells and a sawed-off rifle.' The ri-
fle and shells were admitted at trial, over the objections of the
defendants, who were subsequently convicted of armed robbery.
130. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
131. See id at 456.
132. See id. at 460.
133. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
134. See id at 130.
135. See id.
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The trial court found that the defendants, who did not own or
drive the car, lacked standing to challenge the lawfulness of the
search of the car, and thus, lacked standing to challenge the
admissibility of the rifle and shells.'
Throughout Rakas, the Court emphasized the unique nature
of an automobile. The "Court has recognized significant differ-
ences between motor vehicles and other property which permit
warrantless searches of automobiles in circumstances in which
warrantless searches would not be reasonable in other con-
texts."' However, more important was the Court's willing-
ness to break with an established bright-line rule and find that
passengers in an automobile lack standing to challenge the
legality of an automobile stop or search. Under the standing
rule developed in Jones v. United States,' the petitioners in
Rakas had a very strong argument that as passengers they
were "legitimately on the premises" and as such had standing
to challenge the legality of the initial stop and subsequent
search of the automobile.' The Court abandoned Jones'
bright-line rule, which had stood for eighteen years. In its
place, the Court articulated a standard based on reasonable
expectations of privacy as articulated in Katz v. United
States.1' Based on the Court's historic recognition of a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in an automobile, the new rule
prevented passengers from challenging the constitutionality of
automobile searches and seizures.
As the Court's proffered justifications for treating the auto-
mobile as distinct for Fourth Amendment purposes become
increasingly rhetorical, and the Court repeatedly uses automo-
bile cases to break new ground in the Fourth Amendment con-
text, it is clear that the automobile taint is a determinative
factor. In Mimms, and now Wilson, neither drivers nor passen-
gers are free from this taint. In both cases, the Court relied on
the inordinate risk of vehicle encounters to justify diminished
136. See id at 131-32.
137. Id at 154 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)).
138. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
139. Id. at 267.
140. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Fourth Amendment protections." In both cases, the Court
cited a single study to illustrate the dangers faced by police of-
ficers in traffic stop situations.' However, in his dissent,
both in Mimms and Wilson, Justice Stevens detailed the specific
findings of each study, arguing that this "inordinate risk"
lacked an empirical foundation.'
Thus, the Court in Wilson relied on little more than a bare
assumption regarding police officer safety to justify a bright-line
rule permitting an officer to order all of the occupants of a
vehicle to alight. This lack of empirical support, both for the
alleged danger faced by police officers and the contention that
ordering all of the occupants out of the vehicle will increase
officer safety, supports the notion that the automobile taint was
an important factor in the Court's determination. Were the
Court required to make a strong showing that traffic stops pose
a significant risk to police officers and that ordering occupants
out of the vehicle helps diminish that risk, statistics specifically
supporting these propositions undoubtedly could be uncovered.
However, since the issue was raised in the automotive context,
accurate statistics were not required. The automotive taint
provided the basis for the Court's decision; statistics and bal-
ancing analysis were the packaging. Understanding this factor
is critical to understanding the Court's willingness to overturn
the Maryland court and recognize the seizure of an innocent
passenger without any level of suspicion. Contrary to Justice
Stewart's admonition in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,' the
automobile has become "a talisman in whose presence the
Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears."'"
141. See Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885 (1977); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977).
142. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885; Mimrns, 434 U.S. at 110.
143. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 118
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. 403 U.S. 433 (1971).
145. Id. at 461-62.
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IV. WHERE WILSON WILL LEAD: THE SUPREME COURT'S NEXT
STEPS IN FOURTH AMENDMENT AUTOMOBILE JURISPRUDENCE
As in Mimms, the decision in Wilson provides an easy-to-
follow, bright-line standard for police officers in traffic stop
situations. However, several questions remain unanswered by
the Court's decision. In Wilson, Maryland urged the Court to
find that "an officer may forcibly detain a passenger for the
entire duration of the stop."' However, the Court expressed
no opinion on the matter, stating that the facts of the case did
not place the question before the Court.14' The Court also
avoided addressing the issue of whether an officer may frisk a
passenger for weapons.
A. An Automatic Police Prerogative to Detain Passengers
The Court in Wilson specifically recognized that police officers
must exercise unquestioned command of the situation if they
are to protect themselves from the possible dangers associated
with a traffic stop.' This same general principle supports an
automatic police prerogative to detain the occupants of a law-
fully stopped car for the duration of the stop. In fact, having
ordered the passengers out of the vehicle, a police officer's need
to detain them actually increases.
The Court in Wilson stated that police officers face greater
danger when passengers are present in a stopped vehicle.'
The danger to officers increases because there are more
146. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886 n.3.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 886. The Court incorporated this principle into its decision by
analogizing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), to the facts presented in
Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886. In Summers, the Court expressly recognized that
Although no special danger to the police is suggested by the evidence in
this record, the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind
of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to
conceal or destroy evidence. The risk of harm to both the police and the
occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned com-
mand of the situation.
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03 (emphasis added).
149. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885.
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"possible sources of harm."'5 The Court suggested that it is
safer to have the passengers outside of the vehicle, because
once outside, the passenger is denied access to any weapons
which may be concealed inside.'5 However, the Court immedi-
ately conceded that
the possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the
ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding viola-
tion, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious
crime might be uncovered during the stop. And the motiva-
tion of a passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehen-
sion of such a crime is every bit as great as that of the
driver.12
The focus of the Court's inquiry in Wilson was limited to the
risks posed by passengers seated in a stopped automobile. How-
ever, when turning to the risks these passengers represent
when standing outside of the vehicle, most of the same concerns
remain. In characterizing the risk passengers represent in
traffic stop situations, the Court in Wilson did not suggest that
a passenger's motivation to employ violence simply dissipates
when they are ordered out of a vehicle. Additionally, while the
Court did state that a passenger is denied access to a concealed
weapon in the car, it did not address the very real possibility
that a passenger might be carrying a concealed weapon on his
or her person. This possibility becomes particularly important
when a passenger is standing outside of a vehicle and can ap-
proach the officer from behind, unless the officer can detain
him or her.'
While not cited by the Wilson majority, State v. Landry'
parallels the Court's analysis in uncanny detail, and suggests
that a police officer's prerogative to detain a passenger is rea-
sonable." In Landry, a police officer ordered the passenger
150. Id.
151. See id. at 886.
152. Id.
153. If an officer cannot detain passengers once they have been ordered out of a
car, passengers could presumably leave the scene. However, officers are then faced
with the very real possibility that a passenger, having left, will return to launch an
attack against the unsuspecting officer.
154. 588 So. 2d 345 (La. 1991).
155. Compare Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885-86 with Landry, 588 So. 2d at 347, which
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out of a lawfully stopped car and then asked the passenger for
identification. 6 The court assumed, without deciding, that the
passenger was seized when the police officer asked for his iden-
tification.' However, the court concluded that the request
was "a limited additional intrusion into [the] defendant's priva-
cy that was not unreasonable under the circumstances. " '
A Supreme Court decision on this issue will almost certainly
follow the same reasoning employed in Landry. The Court in
Wilson described passengers as possible sources of harm. 9
The notion that these sources of harm are free to walk away
from a stopped car, out of view of the police officer, is absurd
given the Court's fixation with police officer safety. Unless a
police officer is armed with the automatic prerogative to order
passengers to remain at a specified location, the risk of attack
from a passenger increases substantially.
For the Court, this risk should significantly outweigh the
incremental intrusion in the passenger's privacy interest. The
passenger is not being asked to expose anything more to the
public by remaining at the scene for the duration of the stop.
Additionally, as a practical matter, a passenger's only option in
many circumstances will be to remain with the vehicle for the
duration of the stop." ° Thus, the Court will almost certainly
characterize this additional intrusion on the passenger's privacy
interest as de minimis and find that a temporary detention of a
passenger is reasonable under the circumstances. To do other-
wise would completely undermine a police officer's "unques-
tioned command of the situation."'6'
B. Drawing the Line at Terry Frisks-No Physical Touching of
uses an identical line of reasoning.
156. See Landry, 588 So. 2d at 345.
157. See id at 348.
158. Id.
159. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885.
160. This is particularly true in situations where the traffic stop takes place on a
highway or other road where "civilization" is more than a short walk away. The fact
that someone is in a car suggests that their destination is not within walking dis-
tance. As a practical matter, many passengers will have no other option than to
remain with the automobile until the completion of the stop.
161. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
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a Passenger Without Reasonable Suspicion
While the Supreme Court is likely to find that a police officer
may, as a matter of right, detain passengers once they have
been ordered out of a vehicle, it is unlikely that it will go so far
as to permit officers to frisk these passengers without reason-
able articulable suspicion that they are dangerous. In Ybarra v.
Illinois,'62 the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of
patting down a bar patron during the execution of a search
warrant. The Court was asked to "find that the first pat down
search of Ybarra constituted a reasonable frisk for weapons
under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio."' However, the Court re-
fused to find that the pat down was reasonable, citing the lack
of a "reasonable belief that [Ybarra] was armed and presently
dangerous."' The mere fact that Ybarra was present in a bar
that was subject to a search warrant did not, without more,
give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he was
dangerous."6
While the facts in Ybarra were limited to the execution of a
search warrant at a bar, the Court recognized that it had dis-
posed of the same general issue thirty years before in an auto-
mobile case. In United States v. Di Re," the Court reviewed
the search of a car passenger which occurred during the arrest
of the driver. In deciding the reasonableness of the search, the
Court was not convinced that "a person, by mere presence in a
suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to
which he would otherwise be entitled." 67
At the core of the Court's decisions in Ybarra and Di Re is a
recognition of the sanctity of "the person" for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes. Expressly protected by the Constitution, the
person, like the house, enjoys a special status and heightened
protections from police intrusion." Although a person in an
162. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
163. Id. at 92 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 92-93.
165. See Ud at 91. "But, a person's mere propinquity to others independently sus-
pected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to
search that person." Id. (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968)).
166. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
167. Id. at 587.
168. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of people to be secure in their persons,
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automobile is ultimately affected by the automobile taint, it is
very likely that the historic recognition of the sanctity of the
person will protect passengers from police pat downs that are
not supported by an articuable reasonable suspicion.
V. CONCLUSION-THE IMPACT OF WILSON
While the Court's decision in Wilson ultimately is not sur-
prising, the ramifications and likely implications of it are signif-
icant. As part of every traffic stop, regardless of the circum-
stances, a police officer may now order all of the occupants out
of the vehicle. Wilson represents perhaps one of the more pal-
atable set of circumstances in which the new rule will be ap-
plied. A healthy adult is ordered to alight from a car on a sum-
mer evening. Given the millions of traffic stops that occur each
year, it is foreseeable that not all stops will be as straightfor-
ward.'69 Under the rule announced in Wilson, an officer may
order an entire family, including young children, out of the
family car and into a snowstorm. The Court makes no excep-
tions or allowances for the elderly or the disabled. Officers may,
and likely will, order elderly passengers out of vehicles to stand
on the side of a busy highway. Perhaps the majority would find
the image of a paraplegic passenger, ordered out of a vehicle to
sit in a pouring rain, no less compelling than the scenario pre-
sented in Wilson. The Court's decision certainly does not call
for a different result.
But perhaps more alarming than the Court's isolated holding
is the point raised by Justice Kennedy's dissent. The Court's
decision in Wilson, coupled with Whren, "puts tens of millions
of passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the police."" ° The
Court in Whren found that an officer's actual motives in
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated." Id. (emphasis added).
169. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the ANNUAL
REPORT OF MARYLAND JUDICIARY 80 (1994-1995), which found that in the state of
Maryland alone, there were well over one million non-tort motor vehicle cases during
a one-year period).
170. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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stopping a vehicle are irrelevant. As long as there is "some
objective indication that a violation has been committed," courts
will uphold the stop. 171 Thus, as long as there is some objec-
tive support for the stop, not only can police officers stop a
vehicle based on insidious motive, they can indulge their bias a
step further by ordering all of the occupants in the vehicle to
alight. These circumstances seem to be more than the petty in-
dignity that the majority in Wilson suggests such an order
represents.
Justice Kennedy is likely correct when he stated that, "[m]ost
officers ... will exercise their new power with discretion and
restraint; and no doubt this often will be the case."' He
went on to point out, however, that this argument misses the
point. "Liberty comes not from officials by grace but from the
Constitution by right.""73 Wilson grants police officers the sole
discretion to decide whether or not to order children, the elder-
ly, the disabled, or any innocent passenger out of a stopped
vehicle and onto the shoulder of a highway.
For almost one hundred years, Americans have gone to the
highways looking for the freedom of the open road. Once an
embodiment of individual freedom, the automobile has become a
"talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades
away."7 With mobility and speed has come unfettered police
discretion. This could hardly be what Steppenwolf was looking
for when he headed out on the highway.
Michael Begland
171. Id- (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 891 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
174. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
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